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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KENNETH JAMES MORRELL, : Case No. 890031-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
In an opinion filed on November 30, 1990, this Court 
affirmed Mr. Morrell,s conviction for robbery of pizza delivery man, 
Matthew1' Mooi A 11 o p y at fin? opinion is a It.ached as Appendix 1. 
The sole issue discussed in this petition for rehearing is 
the admissibility under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) of evidence of 
Mr. Morrell's robbery of a pizza delivery man, Paul Thayne 
Christensen (hereinafter "the extrinsic robbery"). At pages 5 
through 7 of this Court's opinion, this Court found that the 
evidence of the extrinsic robbery was probative of Mr. Morrell's 
intent in the encounter with Mr. Moor, and found that the probative 
value of thi s concededly prejudicial evidence justified its 
admission. 
Because this Court's opinion misperceives that intent was 
at issuH in Hiis rase, and thereby seta <\ piocedent that niay 
misguide the application of Rule 404(b) in subsequent cases, 
Mr. Morrell files this petition for rehearing.1 
2. See Brown v. Pickard, 11 P, 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining 
circumstances allowing rehearing); Cummings v. Nielson. 129 P. 619 
(Utah 1913)(same). 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE INTENT WAS NOT AT ISSUE, 
THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE OF THE EXTRINSIC ROBBERY 
REQUIRES REVERSAL OF MR. MORRELL'S CONVICTION. 
On page 6 of this Court's opinion, this Court found that 
intent was a contested issue in this case. The opinion states, 
Defendant directly challenged the element of 
intent. He claimed he was only trying to collect 
a debt through somewhat insistent, but not 
unlawful, means. Defendant was being tried for 
aggravated robbery, which is "the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property" from 
another, "against his will," by threat or use of 
"a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. 
§§76-6-301(1), -302(1)(a)(1990). The only two 
controverted elements of the charge were the use 
of a weapon and defendant's intent. Therefore, 
it was critical for the state that it discredit 
defendant's claim of a coincidental encounter 
with Moor. Admission of prior bad acts is proper 
when it tends to prove a contested material 
element of the crime charged. State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 
1986). Evidence of the prior robbery was highly 
probative of defendant's intent in the present 
case. 
Appendix 1 at 6 (footnote omitted). 
The intent element of robbery is defined by Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-2-103, as follows: "A person engages in conduct 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result." 
Under either version of events presented in this Court's 
opinion, Mr. Morrell possessed the intent requisite to the robbery 
- 2 -
conviction—he had the conscious objective and desire to take money 
from Mr. Moor. Compare paragraphs one through three of the Morrell 
opinion with paragraph 5. See also M. Graham, Handbook of Federal 
Evidence, section 404.5, at page 203 footnote 8 ("'Slough, Relevance 
Unraveled,7 6 Kan. L.Rev. 28, 48 (1957) describes criminal intent 
'as that state of mind which negatives accident, inadvertence or 
casualty.'"); McCormick on Evidence, section 190, 1987 supplement at 
57 ("If the defendant does not deny that his acts were deliberate, 
then the prosecution may not introduce the evidence merely to show 
that the acts were not accidental."). Mr. Morrell's physical 
actions and the lawfulness of the taking were the factors in 
dispute. Mr. Morrell's intent was not in dispute and did not 
justify the admission of evidence of the extrinsic robbery. 
Rehearing is appropriate in this case because, as written, 
the Morrell opinion has the potential to mislead many subsequent 
applications of Rule 404(b). If intent were truly at issue in this 
case, it could be at issue in every case. If the extrinsic robbery 
were truly probative of Mr. Morrell's intent during the events at 
issue in this case, evidence of any intentional act could be 
admissible to prove intent in every case. The court in United 
States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1984), explained 
further how the intent exception under Rule 404(b) must be 
interpreted in a fashion that facilitates, rather than defeats, the 
purpose of the rule. The court stated, 
We have previously distinguished between 
situations in which intent is in issue because 
the government must show specific intent as an 
essential element of the crime and when intent is 
- 3 -
only a formal issue that can be inferred from the 
act. When the crime charged requires proof of 
specific intent, we have held that, because it is 
a material element to be proved by the 
government, it is necessarily in issue and the 
government may submit evidence of other acts in 
an attempt to establish the matter in its 
case-in-chief, assuming the other requirements of 
Rules 404(b) and 403 are satisfied. E.g., United 
States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 
1978)(since in mail fraud case specific intent to 
defraud must be proved, government was entitled 
to introduce evidence of prior similar acts even 
though defendant had not disputed the issue by 
claiming he acted innocently or mistakenly). On 
the other hand, we have stated that when intent 
is only a formal issue, so that proof of the 
proscribed act gives rise to an inference of 
intent then unless the government has reason to 
believe that the defense will raise intent as an 
issue, evidence of other acts directed toward 
this issue should not be used in the government's 
case-in-chief and should not be admitted until 
the defendant raises the issue. E.g.. United 
States v. Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020, 1022-23 (7th 
Cir. 1969)("To justify admission into evidence of 
an accused's prior criminal acts to establish 
willfulness and intent it is necessary that 
willfulness and intent be more than merely formal 
issues in the sense that the defendant is 
entitled to an instruction thereon."); see also 
United States v. Fearns, 601 F.2d 486, 491 (7th 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461, 
466 (7th Cir. 1981). To allow intent 
automatically to become an issue in that class of 
cases in which intent is inferable from the 
nature of the act charged would create an 
exception that "would virtually swallow the rule 
against admission of evidence of prior 
misconduct." United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 
1001, 1009 (6th Cir. 1975). 
Id. at 781. The cases cited by the Shackleford court further 
demonstrate that because Mr. Morrell's intent was not in dispute, 
the evidence of the extrinsic robbery should not have been admitted. 
- 4 -
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reconsider its analysis of the 
admissibility of the extrinsic robbery under Rule 404(b) as proof of 
Mr. Morrell's intent in the encounter with Mr. Moor.2 
DATED this ^iL day of January, 1991. 
Attoipey fopAppellant/Petitioner 
2. In the event that this Court grants this petition for 
rehearing, Mr. Morrell requests the Court to address the fact that 
the jurors were instructed that the evidence of the extrinsic 
robbery could be used "to impeach Mr. Moor's credibility and to show 
7proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' (R. 98-99)." 
Appellant's brief at 34. Compare Shackleford at 780 ("The jury was 
left to decide what the terms 'motive,' 'intent,' 'plan,' etc. might 
mean in the context of this case and whether the evidence fit into 
any one of these categories. The jury would have had to study 
Weinstein's chapter on 'Relevancy and Its Limits' in order to 
accomplish that assignment properly."). 
Further, if this Court finds that the evidence of the 
extrinsic robbery was relevant to an issue in dispute, and thus 
needs to address the weighing of probative value of the evidence of 
the extrinsic robbery against its prejudicial effect, Mr. Morrell 
refers the Court to Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, section 
404.5, page 223 and n. 34 (explaining that the jurors are most 
likely to convict on the basis of a defendant's perceived propensity 
toward criminal action, rather than on the evidence relevant to the 
charge in question, in cases in which extrinsic crimes greatly 
resemble crimes charged). Compare Morrell at 7 (apparently limiting 
the prejudicial impact of the evidence of the extrinsic robbery to 
its supposedly significant bearing on Mr. Morrell's intent, and 
omitting any mention of the likelihood that the jurors convicted 
Mr. Morrell on the basis of propensity. "Testimony concerning the 
prior robbery was the only evidence, other than defendant's and 
Moor's conflicting testimony, bearing on whether defendant's intent 
was to rob Moor or merely to secure payment of money defendant 
believed he was owed. The testimony, then, was clearly prejudicial 
to defendant."). 
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CERTIFICATION 
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, do hereby certify the following: 
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The State of Utah, ) OPINION 
) (For Publication) 
. t J £ t dud AppeI lee , ) 
) case No. 890031-CA 
) 
) 
Kenneth James Morrell, ) F 1 :. 
D e f e ii d a n t a i i c:i A f • p e 1 1 a n t: 
(November 
Third D i s t r i c t , S a 11: L a ke Co u n ty 
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
Attorneys: Debra K. Loy and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
R. P a u l Van Dam and Ch c i i j t i n e 1'. ->o I h \:\ , Sal!' La ke 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
ORME Judge: 
Defendant Morrell appeals his conviction for robbery, a 
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 
(19 9 0') We affi rm 
FACTS 
Except as otherwise noted, we set forth the facts ii i the 
manner most consistent with the jury's verdict. On September 
4, 1988, Matthew Moor, a pizza delivery driver employed by 
Ambassador Pizza in Salt Lake City, was robbed while attempting 
to deliver a pizza ordered by telephone. As Moor drove to the 
neighborhood of 813 Genessee Street, the address to which he 
was to deliver the pizza, Moor saw defendant Kenneth Morrell 
standing on a corner and asked him for directions. Moor then 
drove a very short distance to 813 Genessee Street and 
discovered that the house was dark and apparently unoccupied. 
As Moor returned to his car, defendant approached him and asked 
to purchase the pizza. Moor offered to sell defendant the 
pizza for five dollars. Defendant pressed an object to Moor's 
neck and told Moon that he was being robbed... 
Defendant got into the car with Mooi and demanded money 
from him. When Moor did not produce the amount of money that 
defendant wanted, defendant had Moor drive to another location 
in order to search the car for more money. He found none. 
Defendant then ordered Moor to drive to a house in the avenues 
area in order to set up a robbery of a Domino's Pizza delivery 
driver. Upon telephoning, defendant found Domino's Pizza 
closed and told Moor that he had better produce more money. 
Moor suggested that they drive to his friend's house to get 
money, and defendant agreed. 
Moor drove to the home ot Iwm llov and sat in the 
driveway honking the horn. When liov approached the car he 
discerned that Moor was in some sort of trouble. Moor asked 
llov for money, stating that defendant was holding a knife to 
him. llov broke through the window and attempted to restrain 
defendant. Defendant escaped and Moor and llov gave chase. As 
Moor reached him, defendant hit Moor, breaking Moor's nose. 
Moor caught defendant again and llov assisted in restraining 
him, A passing taxi driver summoned police. 
When the police aiLived, one officer took custody of 
defendant from llov and asked defendant: "What's going on?" 
Defendant did not respond. Defendant was arrested after Moor 
was interviewed by another officer and the officers concluded 
that i robbery had occurred. 
At trial, defendant testified he saw Moor dn/ing in 
defendant's neighborhood and recognized both Moor and his car. 
He stated that he had sold some marijuana to Moor at a party 
for which Moor still owed money to defendant. Defendant 
claimed that when Moor pulled over to ask street directions of 
defendant he asked Moor about the debt. Defendant testified 
that Moor did not respond, but pushed the pizza out the window 
at defendant. Defendant then got in the car and again asked 
Moor about the money owed for the marijuana. Moor did not havi 
enough money to satisfy the debt and suggested that they go 
elsewhere to get more money. Eventually, defendant and Moor 
arrived at IloVs home, where the defendant's account of the 
events largely corresponds with Moor's. 
The trial court precluded detense counsel from 
cross-examining Moor concerning his drug and alcohol use, and 
any related possible effect on his ability to recall prior 
encounters with defendant which may have supported defendant's 
claim of a drug sales debt. The court also allowed testimony 
j^y
 a p0xice detective that the telephone used to place the 
pizza order incident to the robbery in this case, like others 
which had occurred, was not located at the address stated by 
the person placing the order. 
The jury convicted defendant of robbery. On appeal 
defendant raises several evidentiary issues. First, defendant 
attacks the trial court's admission of evidence of his guilty 
plea to a prior robbery and of the facts underlying that plea. 
Second, defendant challenges the admission of evidence of his 
silence in response to the initial question put to him by 
policp Third, defendant claims thif fhe trial court 
improperly limited cross-examination of the robbery victim and 
in admitting hearsay testimony by a police officer. 
EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR ROBBERY 
Defendant challenges, under rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, the admission of his guilty plea to a 
similn robbery of a pizza del Iveryman, Defendant claims that 
a guilty plea is not equivalent to a conviction and that 
robbery is not a crime of dishonesty automatically admissible 
under Rule 609(a) (2 i io review the trial court's evidentiary 
rulings only for an abuse of discretion which results in 
prejudice to substantial rights. State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 
1093, 1094 (Utah Ct App 1989); State v. Jamison, Tb7 P 2d 
134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The state concedes that 
admission of the guilty plea to theft, on the ground that theft 
may automatically be treated as a crime of dishonesty, was 
improper 2 WP aqree, 
1. Defendant also raises a challenge under the Confrontation 
Clause, U.S. Const, amend. VI, asserting that he was denied the 
constitutional right of confrontation when the trial court 
limited cross-examination of Matthew Moor. However, defendant 
failed to make this specific objection, as required by Utah 
Rule jf Evidence 103(a)(1), and therefore has waived his claim 
insofar as premised on confrontation grounds. See State v. 
Eldredce, 773 P.2d 29, 34 (Utah) (failure to object precludes 
review of evidentiary matters except In case of plain error), 
cert, denied, 110 S.H 67 (1989) 
Thp *jMte argues, however, that I" he guilty plea should tu* 
treated as a conviction for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2), relying 
on State v. Delashmutt, 676 P.2d 383, 384 (Utah 1983)(per 
curiam). In our view, Delashmutt has questionable value as 
Rule 609(a)(2) p r o v id e s that evidence ot conviction for 
any crime involving dishonesty or a false statement is 
admissible to attack the credibility of a witness. The focus 
of the rule concerns impeachment based on the probability that 
\ particular witness may not be telling the truth as evidenced 
by prior acts of dishonesty on the part of that witness- Any 
act done with knowledge of its unlawfulness involves a measure 
of dishonesty is commonly defined. Nonetheless, Rule 609(a)(2) 
was drafted to restrict automatic admissibility to those crimes 
which are committed by means of deceit or fraud and thus bear 
directly on a witness's tendency to offer untruthful 
testimony. &££ State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah CI 
App. 1988) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing legislative 
history of subsection 609(a)(2)), 
While some dispute exists as to whether robbery should be 
classified as a crime of dishonesty, see State v. Wight, 765 
P 2d 12, 21-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Garff, J., concurring), it-
is established under Utah law that the crime of robbery does 
not automatically qualify for admission under Rule 609(a)(2). 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989) (robbery 
conviction not automatically admissible); State v. Brown, 7/1 
P.2d 1093, 1094-95 (Utah Ct, App. 1989) (conviction of theft 
crimes not automatically admissible); State v. Wight, 765 P,2d 
at 17-19 (aggravated robbery conviction not automatically 
admissible) 
(Footnote 2 continued) 
precedent. Significant case law concerning the nature of 
guilty pleas has developed since Delashmutt which gives doubt 
to its continued vitality. See, e.g., State v. Galleoos, 738 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987); State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1303-5 
(Utah 1986) . Defendant had merely entered his plea on the 
other charge, and had neither been adjudged guilty nor 
sentenced by the court In view of the liberality with which 
motions to withdraw guilty pleas are to be granted prior to 
sentence, see, e.g., Galleoos, 738 P. 2d at 1042 ("presentence 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be 
liberally granted"), we see real difficulty, for Rule 609(a)(*i 
purposes, in equating a mere guilty plea, prior to sentencing, 
with an actual conviction. As explained hereafter, however, wi« 
need not definitively decide this issue since any error in 
admission of Hie guilty plea under Rule 609 was harmless in 
view of the admissibility of other evidence of the crimp under 
Rule 404(b). 
The trial court made no inquiry into the facts underlying 
defendant's guilty plea in its consideration of admissibility. 
Therefore, nothing in the record demonstrates a consideration 
of facts relative to defendant's prior theft to determine thei i 
relevance, if any, to defendant's propensity to tell the 
truth.3 See Wight, 765 P.2d at 18 (under 609(a)(2), crime of-
robbery may be admissible if underlying facts demonstrate 
impairment of credibility). 
Although conceding the guilty plea could not properiy come 
in under Rule 609, the state claims we should nonetheless 
affirm because evidence of the facts underlying the prior 
robbery charge, offered through the testimony of the victim in 
that case, was admissible under Rule 404(b) as probative of 
defendant's intent to iob Moor and in refutation of 
defendants claim that he was merely attempting collection of i 
debt. Rule 404(b) establishes certain circumstances in which 
evidence ?f O U U M crimes may bf-1 admitted: 
Evidence ot other crimes, wrongs Dr actr 
is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show that he acted 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, ui 
absence of mistake or accident. 
Utah k. Evid. 404(b). 
3. Convictions not admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) may yet be 
admissible under subsection fa'n]\ */hich provides Eor 
admission of prior convictions where the court determines that 
the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. The 
court must inquire into the probative value of the facts 
supporting the conviction and balance them against potential 
prejudice. State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986). 
In Banner, the Supreme Court listed five factors to be 
considered. i£. The trial court in this case did not consider 
the Banner factors and we therefore do not decide whether the 
guilty plea could have been admitted under Rule 609(a)(1). Noz 
did the state argue that defendant's particular brand of 
robbery—characterized by false statements concerning his 
telephone number, his whereabouts, and his desire to obtiiri anil 
pay for pizza—had sufficient bearing on his propensity to tell 
the truth to distinguish his crime from garden-variety theft so 
as to permit the evidencp to come in under either Rule 
609(a)(2) or 609(a)(1) . 
Defendant directly challenged the element of intent. He 
claimed he was only trying to collect a debt through somewhat 
insistent, but not unlawful, means. Defendant was being tried 
for aggravated robbery, which is "the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property" from another, "against his will," 
by threat or use of "a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-301(1), -302(1)(a) (1990). The only two controverted 
elements of the charge were the use of a weapon4 and 
defendant's intent. Therefore, it was critical for the state 
that it discredit defendant's claim of a coincidental encounter 
with Moor Admission of prior bad acts is proper when it tends 
to prove a contested material element of the crime charged. 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986), Evidence of the 
prior robbery was highly probative of defendant's inter- - * 
present case. 
Even though the evidence was otherwise
 a^JXIissibie 
Rule 404(b), we must nevertheless determine whether the 
prejudicial nature of the evidence substantially overshadowed 
its probative value under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. See Sta 
v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). This is a 
fact-intensive question, delegated by the Rules of Evidence t 
the discretion of the trial court. We therefore review 
determinations of admissibility under Rule 403 only for abuse 
of discretion, ifl. Only if discretion is abused and prejudi 
results will ^h& re ; - mistake constitute reversi b1e error. 
Id. 
In State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court listed several factors which are helpful in 
balancing probativeness and prejudice. 
j n cjecjL(j^ng whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, 
a variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength :>£ the evidence as 
4. Defendant was convicted of simple robbery under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990), manifesting that the jury did not find 
he used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon. The jury 
apparently concluded that the object defendant pressed against 
Moor was only a plastic nametag. 
to the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between 
the crimes, the need for the evidence, the 
efficacy of alternative proof and the 
degree to which the evidence probably will 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
id. at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormicK on Evidence § 190 
at 565 (3d ed. 1984)). The record reflects that counsel for 
defendant and the state presented arguments based on these 
factors. The trial court then ruled that the evidence was 
admissible. 
Testimony concerning the prior robbery was the only 
evidence, other than defendant's and Moor's conflicting 
testimony, bearing on whether defendant's intent was to rob 
Moor or merely to secure payment of money defendant believed he 
was owed. The testimony, then, was clearly prejudicial to 
defendant. It was, however, extremely probative of defendant's 
intent during the incident with Moor. The two robberies for 
which defendant was charged occurred within months of each 
other. Each manifested an almost identical factual pattern. 
There was strong evidence of defendant's guilt in the prior 
robbery in view of competent eyewitness testimony from the 
victim in that case. The state had a great need to present 
this evidence to demonstrate intent; no effective alternative 
proof was available. Cf. Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296 (even where 
-other evidences of defendant's intent" are introduced, "the 
use of . . . other-crimes evidence" is "not necessarily" 
precluded). We cannot say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in weighing these factors and determining that the 
probative value substantially outweighed the prejudicial 
effect. It was therefore not incumbent upon the court to 
exclude the evidence under Rule 403. Because admission of the 
evidence was proper under Rule 404(b), and not barred by Rule 
403, any error in admission of the guilty plea under Rule 
609(a)(2) is harmless. 
EVIDENCE OF PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE 
During the cross-examination of one officer, the 
prosecution elicited testimony of defendant's silence when he 
was asked by another police officer what was happening. This 
question was asked immediately after the arrival of the 
officers, who took control of defendant from Ilov. No Miranda 
warning had been given, and defendant claims for this reason 
that the court erred in allowing improper comment on his 
silence. The state asserts that the testimony was proper as 
demonstrating intent to rob Moor since defendant did not 
exculpate himself by stating that he was merely endeavoring to 
collect a debt. 
in Miranda vt Arizona, 384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966), the 
Supreme Court held that the prosecution is barred from using 
statements stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant 
unless the defendant had been informed of the right to remain 
silent, the right to counsel, the right to appointed counsel if 
indigent, and that any statement may be used against the 
defendant. Not all police inquiry is made in the context of 
custodial interrogation. On the contrary, 
[t]he Utah Supreme Court has identified 
several key factors to consider in order 
to determine when a defendant 
who has not been formally arrested is 
in custody. They are: (1) the site 
of interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; 
(3) whether the objective indicia of 
arrest were present; and (4) the 
length and form of interrogation. 
Salt Lake Citv v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168, 
1171 (Utah 1983). Another factor which we 
find pertinent to our analysis was 
recognized by our Oregon counterpart in 
State v. Herrera, 49 Or. App. 1075, 621 
P.2d 1209 (1980). That factor is (5) 
whether the defendant came to the place of 
interrogation freely and willingly. 1&. 
at 1212. 
State v. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Treating these factors in order, the following conclusions 
emerge. First, the site of interrogation was a public parking 
lot which, unlike interrogation at the police station, StSSL ill- # 
does not suggest custody. Second, the investigation had not 
yet focused on defendant. When the officers arrived at the 
scene and observed defendant restrained by Ilov, they knew 
nothing more than that an altercation had been reported, and 
that a pizza driver was possibly missing in the same general 
vicinity. The officers had no reason to know or suspect that 
the two reports were connected. Nor did they know the reason 
for the altercation and which party to the altercation, if any, 
was the culprit. At the time of the question the officers did 
not know if a crime had been committed, nor had any 
investigation yet focused on defendant. Contemporaneously with 
the question, but some distance from where it was asked, Moor 
exited a nearby restaurant, where he had gone to attend to his 
broken nose, and spoke with another officer who determined that 
Moor was the victim of a robbery and defendant was the apparent 
perpetrator. Nothing more was asked of defendant from that 
time. To that point, defendant's encounter with the police 
constituted nothing more than a general investigation to 
determine whether a crime had even been committed. Third, 
while it is apparent that defendant had been momentarily 
restrained by police officers when the question was put to him, 
other objective indicia of arrest were lacking. Defendant was 
not handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle, or told he was 
under arrest. Fourth, the length of interrogation was 
exceptionally brief and the form of interrogation, on which 
"Utah courts have placed a great deal of emphasis," i£., was 
merely investigatory and in no sense accusatory. See id. The 
question asked of defendant was merely part of a preliminary 
attempt to ascertain exactly that which was asked—"What's 
going on?" Fifth, while defendant had not come to the place of 
questioning voluntarily, he had also not been taken there by 
police against his will—he was chased there by citizens trying 
to apprehend him. 
While the fifth factor might be taken as "relatively 
'neutral,'" ifl., each of the other factors are not suggestive 
of custody. Taken together, the factors compel the conclusion 
that defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation and 
no Miranda warning was required.5 S££ also State v. Kellv, 718 
5. In view of our disposition, we need not consider the 
state's alternative argument that, in any event, defendant's 
silence was admissible to impeach a defense offered for the 
first time at trial. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 
605-607 (1982). But see People v. Jacobs, 158 Cal. App. 3d 
740, 750, 204 Cal. Rptr. 849, 856 (1984) (rejecting Fletcher v. 
Weir analysis under state constitutional provision nearly 
identical to federal counterpart); State v. Davis, 38 Wash. 
App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1984) (rejecting Fletcher v. 
Weir analysis under state constitutional provision identical to 
federal counterpart); Nelson v. State, 691 P.2d 1056, 1059-60 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting Fletcher v. Weir analysis 
under state constitutional provision nearly identical to 
federal counterpart). 
P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986) (brief questioning inside defendant's 
home not interrogation); Salt Lake City v. Carner 664 P.2d 
1168, 1170 (Utah 1983) (police not required to give warning 
upon asking investigatory question). 
HEARSAY & LIMITATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Defendant claims that the court's limitation of 
cross-examination of Moor and the admission of certain hearsay 
testimony was erroneous. We review evidentiary rulings for a 
clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093, 1094 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) . 
On direct examination, Moor testified he had never seen 
defendant at a party. On cross-examination Moor conceded that 
he had attended parties of which he thereafter did not have 
complete recollection. Defense counsel asked if Moor's memory 
deficiency might be related to drug or alcohol use and whether 
it was possible that Moor had met defendant at such a party and 
did not recall the encounter because of the influence of 
alcohol or drugs. The court sustained the prosecution's 
objections to both questions. 
Defendant had the right to impeach Moor's credibility by 
attacking his memory. Utah R. Evid. 607. Even though this 
right is limited by the witness's right to be free from 
harassment and humiliation, State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 
1233 (Utah 1980), defendant must be allowed to elicit testimony 
concerning a witness's ability to recall the event about which 
the witness is testifying. Moor's possible alcohol and drug 
use and any impact on his memory were relevant to the 
credibility of his testimony refuting defendant's claimed 
defense of debt collection growing out of prior dealings with 
Moor. Consequently, it was error for the court to prevent 
testimony which probed Moor's possible inability to remember 
the party at which defendant claimed to have met him and to 
have sold him drugs for which Moor was to pay defendant later. 
Defendant also challenges a detective's testimony 
concerning the telephone locations from which pizza orders were 
made and the telephone numbers left with the order taker. The 
6. We do not consider his related claim that even if the 
court's decisions in these respects can be sustained under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, his right to confrontation was 
nonetheless denied. See note 1, supra. 
detective testified that in both the robbery at issue and the 
prior robbery, the number left did not correspond to the pay 
telephone from which the call had been made, although in both 
instances the numbers were merely rearranged* Defendant claims 
this testimony was improper hearsay. 
The state claims the business records and public records 
exceptions of Utah Rule of Evidence 803 allow admission of the 
officer's testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 803(6), (8). However, 
the police report, and not the business record of the pizza 
company, was the source to which the officer referred in his 
testimony. Police reports are not eligible for admission under 
either of these provisions of Rule 803 except in certain 
limited circumstances not applicable here. Utah R. Evid. 
803(8)(B). See State v. Bertul. 664 P.2d 1181, 1184-86 (Utah 
1983) . 
We need not determine, however, whether the court's errors 
in limiting cross-examination of Moor and permitting the 
detective's hearsay testimony rise to the level of a clear 
abuse of discretion. Any error in either instance was harmless 
and would not entitle defendant to reversal. See State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). 
Concerning the limitations on cross-examination, defendant 
was allowed to present his defense of debt collection stemming 
from an alleged marijuana sale to Moor. The jury learned that 
defendant claimed Moor used illegal drugs and had heard Moor 
admit that he had been to parties of which he later had no 
memory. While defendant should have been allowed to pursue 
questioning of Moor's memory ability, defendant established the 
important point that Moor's memory of parties was imperfect, a 
matter the jury was free to consider in deciding Moor's 
credibility. The exact reason for this deficiency was much 
less important. 
Concerning the telephone testimony, the facts of 
defendant's prior robbery were properly introduced through the 
testimony of the victim in that incident. Defendant also 
admitted his participation in that robbery. The precise 
methodology of telephone usage in both instances was therefore 
comparatively inconsequential to the outcome. 
Viewing the other substantial evidence supporting 
defendant's conviction, we cannot say that defendant might not 
have been convicted without the officer's testimony concerning 
the telephone numbers or if the jury had learned more about the 
exact reason Moor had incomplete recall of some parties he had 
attended. 
CONCLUSION 
While the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 
prior robbery under Rule 609, the same evidence was properly 
admitted under Rule 404(b)* Defendant was not subjected to 
custodial interrogation, and therefore was not entitled to a 
Miranda warning. Finally, any error in admission of the 
officer's hearsay testimony concerning the phone numbers and 
the limitation on cross-examination concerning Moor's prior 
drug or alcohol use was harmless. Defendant's conviction is 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
